

Computer-aided Verification and Construction under Relaxed Memory Models


Graduate School Weak Consistency (weacon)

Roland Meyer

Technische Universität Kaiserslautern

Concurrent Programs with Shared Memory

- Finite number of **shared variables** $\{x, y, x_1, \dots\}$
- Finite **data domain** $\{d, d_0, d_1, \dots\}$
- Finite number of **finite-control threads** T_1, \dots, T_n with **operations**:
 $w(x, d), \quad r(x, d)$



Dekker's mutual exclusion protocol.

Sequential Consistency (SC) Semantics [Lamport 1979]

- Threads directly write to and read from memory
- Classical **interleaving semantics**
 - ▶ **Computations** of different threads are **shuffled**
 - ▶ **Program order** is **preserved** for each thread

$x = y = 0$			Mem
Thread 1	Thread 2	Thread 1	x
$a : x = 1$	$p : y = 1$	$pc = a$	0
$b : \text{if}(y == 0)\{$	$q : \text{if}(x == 0)\{$		
$c : \text{crit. sect. 1}$	$r : \text{crit. sect. 2}$	Thread 2	y
$d : \}$	$s : \}$	$pc = p$	0

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
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


Total Store Ordering (TSO) Semantics [SPARC 1994, x86]

- Sequential Consistency **forbids compiler and hardware optimizations**
- Hence is **not implemented** by any processor
- Processors have various buffers to **reduce latency of memory accesses**
- Behavior captured by **relaxed memory models**
- Here: **Total Store Ordering (TSO)** memory model


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
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
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
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
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
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Relaxed executions may lead to **bad behavior**

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This is where our verification techniques apply

Outline

- 1 Shared Memory Concurrency
 - Sequential Consistency Semantics
 - Total Store Ordering Semantics
- 2 Reachability
- 3 Robustness
- 4 Synchronization Inference

Reachability

[Atig, Bouajjani, Burckhardt, Musuvathi, POPL'10]

State Reachability Problem

Consider a *memory model* MM

State Reachability Problem for MM

Input: Program P and a (control + memory) state s .

Problem: Is s reachable when P is run under MM ?

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Decidability / Complexity ?

Each thread is finite-state

- For the SC memory model, this problem is **PSPACE-complete**

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- For the SC memory model, this problem is **PSPACE-complete**
- **Non-trivial** for relaxed memory models:

$Paths_{TSO}(P) = Closure_{TSO}(Paths_{SC}(P))$ is **non-regular**

Reachability

[Atig, Bouajjani, Burckhardt, Musuvathi, POPL'10]

Decidability:

Simulation of TSO semantics by Lossy Channel Systems

Decidability of State Reachability for TSO

Theorem [ABBM 2010]

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Corollary


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From TSO to LCS 1/5

Thread 1: `x = 1; y = 1; x = 2; y = 2; y = 3;`

Thread 2: `if (x == 2) { if (y == 0) { ... } }`

Write buffers are **perfect FIFO channels**




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


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


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


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


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
Thread 2 reads `x = 2`

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
Thread 2 deadlocks as $y = 1$

From TSO to LCS 2/5

Thread 1: `x = 1; y = 1; x = 2; y = 2; y = 3;`

Thread 2: `if (x == 2) { if (y == 0) { ... } }`

- Write buffers made for **batch processing**
- **Batch processing** is similar to **lossiness**
- So assume write buffers are **lossy** FIFO channels




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


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


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


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
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
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
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This is wrong! Lost the effect of $w(y, 1)$.

From TSO to LCS 3/5

TSO buffer = perfect FIFO channel



Mem


0

x

0

y

Channel = sequence of **memory states** + **lossiness**



Mem

0


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
0

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0

x


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Lossiness = **unobservable memory states**

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
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0

x


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
0

x

0

y

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Mem

1

x


0

y

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
1

x

0

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1

x


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
1

x

0

y

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Mem

2

x


1

y

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
1

x

1

y

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2

x


1

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
2

x

1

y

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Mem

2

x

1

y

Lossiness = **unobservable memory states**

From TSO to LCS 4/5



- *Write: Compute a new memory state; send it to the channel*
- *Read: Check the channel/memory*
- *Memory update: Receive a state; copy it to the memory*

From TSO to LCS 4/5

Problem: Interference between threads?



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From TSO to LCS 4/5

Problem: Interference between threads?

Each thread *guesses writes of other threads*



- *Write:* Compute a new memory state; send it to the channel
- *Read:* Check the channel/memory
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- *Guessed Write:* Send the guessed state to the channel

From TSO to LCS 4/5

Problem: Interference between threads?

Each thread guesses writes of other threads



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Synchronization of the LCS over send actions

Theorem [ABBM 2010]

The state reachability problem for TSO is reducible to the control-state reachability problem for LCS.

State Reachability: Conclusion

- Decidable for TSO (and beyond)
- But it is a hard problem — non-primitive recursive
- However, it is possible to have efficient analysis techniques
- Abstraction-based techniques:

e.g., [Kuperstein, Vechev, Yahav, PLDI'11]

- Symbolic techniques:

[Abdulla, Atig, Chen, Leonardson, Rezine, TACAS'12]

[Linden, Wolper, SPIN'10'11]

Robustness

[Bouajjani, M., Möhlmann, ICALP'11]

[Bouajjani, Derevenetc, M., ESOP'13]

Robustness against TSO

Idea of **robustness**:

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Trace Robustness:


TSO- and SC-traces are the same [Shasha, Snir'88]

Good: Allows for quite relaxed behaviors

Very Good: Only **PSPACE-complete**


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
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
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$r(y, 0)$

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
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
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$$r(y, 0) \cdot w(y, 1) \cdot r(x, 0) \cdot w(x, 1)$$

Traces 2/2

Traces abstract computations to happens before dependencies

Trace($r(y, 0) \cdot w(y, 1) \cdot r(x, 0) \cdot w(x, 1)$)

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


Traces 2/2

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- **Store order**: Order of writes to a variable
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- **Conflict relation**: *read* is overwritten by *write*.

Trace($r(y, 0) \cdot w(y, 1) \cdot r(x, 0) \cdot w(x, 1)$)



Trace Robustness Problem

Consider a **memory model** MM

Trace Robustness Problem against MM

Input: *Program* P .

Problem: Does $Traces_{MM}(P) \subseteq Traces_{SC}(P)$ hold?

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Program P is **robust** against MM iff **all traces** in $Traces_{MM}(P)$ are **acyclic**.

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Shasha and Snir do not give an algorithm to find cyclic traces!

Robustness

[Bouajjani, M., Möhlmann, ICALP'11]


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Upper Bound:


Combinatorics

From Robustness to SC Reachability

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


Deciding Robustness



Understand [shape](#) of minimal violations

Deciding Robustness



Understand **shape** of minimal violations

Check whether computation of **this shape** exists

Robustness

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Upper Bound:

Combinatorics — Locality and Attacks

From Robustness to SC Reachability

Locality of Robustness 1/3

Goal: **Locality**

*We can restrict ourselves to violations where **only one thread** reorders its actions.*

Proof tool: **Minimal violations**

*Number of **inversions** (out-of-program-order placements) **minimal** among all violating computations*

Locality of Robustness 2/3

Consider minimal violation $\alpha \cdot b \cdot \beta \cdot a \cdot \gamma$ where b has overtaken a

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Subword $b_1 \dots b_k$ with

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
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*In a minimal violation, only a **single thread** uses its buffer.*

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
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
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
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
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Saves a reordering, **contradiction to minimality**

Locality of Robustness 3/3


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
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Argumentation similar, delete again r_i

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
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
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
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
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Characterization of Robustness via Attacks 1/2

Reformulate Robustness


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


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
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
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
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- An **attack** is a triple $A = (\text{thread}, \text{write}, \text{read})$
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


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Theorem [BDM'13]


Program P is robust **if and only if** no attack **has a TSO witness**.

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Program P is robust **if and only if** no attack **has a TSO witness**.

The number of attacks is **quadratic** in the size of P .

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Upper Bound:

Combinatorics

From Robustness to SC Reachability

Finding TSO Witnesses with SC Reachability


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
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
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


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
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
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Finding TSO Witnesses with SC Reachability


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
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Finding TSO Witnesses with SC Reachability


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Theorem [BDM'13]

Attack A has a TSO witness iff P_A reaches goal state **under SC**.

Trace Robustness: Conclusion

- Decidable for TSO (and beyond)
- Is an easy problem — PSPACE-complete
- Locality: only one thread uses the buffer
- Analysis parallelizable
- Monitoring techniques:

e.g., [Burckhardt, Musuvathi CAV'08, Sen et al. TACAS'11]

- Static analysis:

[Shasha Snir TOPLAS'88, Alglave, Maranget CAV'11]

- Semantics:

[Owens ECOOP'10]

Synchronization Inference

[Bouajjani, Derevenetc, M., ESOP'13]

Synchronization Inference Problem

Synchronization instructions enforce **visibility** of commands

Synchronization Inference Problem

Synchronization instructions enforce **visibility** of commands

Called **fences** (TSO), syncs, or barriers depending on architecture

Synchronization Inference Problem

Synchronization instructions enforce **visibility** of commands

Called **fences** (TSO), syncs, or barriers depending on architecture

Consider a **weak memory model** MM

Synchronization Inference Problem for MM

Input: Program P and cost function $C : \text{LAB} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{>0}$.

Problem: Find an optimal set of synchronization instructions F so that $P + F$ is robust.

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Focus on TSO (fences)

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Fencing every write yields a robust program:

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Compute an optimal fence set

Phase 1: *Compute candidate fence sets.*

Phase 2: *Select fence sets via integer linear programming (ILP).*

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Consequence: For each attack, compute the irreducible fence sets that eliminate it.

This computation relies on robustness.

Phase 2: Select an Optimal Fence Set

Assume attack A has candidate fence sets $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_n$.

Select one:

$$\sum_{1 \leq i \leq n} x_{\mathcal{F}_i} \geq 1.$$

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Let x^* be an optimal solution to the ILP problem.

Theorem

Fence set $\mathcal{F}(x^*)$ solves the synchronization inference problem.